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I INTRODUCTION
The wave of liberalisation of capital movements, which swept Europe in the1980s and the emerging market countries in the 1990s, has given rise to
the two-corner strategy. This strategy, expounded e.g. by Eichengreen (1994)
and Fischer (2001), holds that only two exchange rate regimes are sustainable:
hard pegs (currency boards, dollarisation) and fully flexible rates. Soft pegs in
the middle, the traditional fixed but adjustable exchange rate regimes as well
as all varieties of crawling bands, are seen as doomed, open to irresistible and
unpredictable speculative attacks. While the predominance of the two corners
remains open to the observation that most countries fear both extremes (see
e.g. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002), it remains true that an increasing
number of countries have exited the soft middle ground, mostly towards the
flexible end of the spectrum. 
Exits from pegged regimes have not been altogether happy, however. As
described by Eichengreen and Masson (1998), most countries hesitate to leave
a pegged regime while it is working well and only consider the exit option
when they are facing speculative pressure, and then it often is too late. The
IMF has encouraged many countries to exercise the option in good times, but
fear of floating and fear of pegging have often prevented this advice from being
heeded. 
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Despite its increasing policy importance, there is preciously little work on
the art of exiting a peg. On the theory side, Rebelo and Végh (2002) ask when
it is optimal to do so. They explore optimal monetary policy in a traditional
Krugman first-generation model of currency crisis, assuming exit costs and
considering the occurrence of fiscal shocks. They find that it is often optimal
to abandon the peg as soon as the shock occurs. 
Empirically, a number of studies have examined exchange rate crises,
sometimes accompanied by banking crises, see e.g. Eichengreen et al. (1995),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Yet, work up to now has focused precisely on
the question of exits from pegs. This is the issue that the present paper aims
to explore. It considers the whole history of exits from pegs to exchange rate
flexibility since 1975, identifies which exits were “peaceful”, and searches for
the conditions under which such peaceful exits are achieved. 
A key issue is whether these characteristics are structural or macro-
economic. As noted above, Eichengreen and Masson (1998) find that peaceful
exits are those which are not undertaken under macroeconomic pressure.
Another view, emphasised in the recent literature on third-generation crises
in emerging market countries (see, e.g. Chang and Velasco, 1999), is that de-
pegging must be preceded by the build-up of adequate financial markets and
institutions. 
One problem that has long plagued the literature on exchange rate
regimes is that it is not always clear what the regime actually is. For a variety
of reasons, de jure regimes often differ from de facto regimes. The authorities
may want to guarantee a fixed rate but find it difficult or impossible, and yet
attempt to retain the fiction that they do so. This is fear of floating, as
described by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Conversely, the authorities may wish
to avoid leaving their exchange rate open to speculative attacks, so they do not
announce any peg. Yet, they do not want to allow for too much exchange rate
volatility and in effect intervene heavily. This is fear of pegging. 
So far, we had to rely on the de jure classification reported by authorities
to the IMF, a classification which has progressively allowed for an increasing
number of regimes. The official classification is clearly unsatisfactory and
creates the risk of misinterpreting what the authorities actually do.
Fortunately, two recent papers, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2002), have offered de facto classifications, based on
demonstrated behaviour. In particular, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) use actual
(market-determined) exchange rates, rather than the officially published ones,
to explore the behaviour of the monetary authorities and derive the de facto
regime. We use the Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R) classification and associated
database to identify actual exits and study the behaviour of the market-
determined exchange rate around these episodes.
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The next section presents the approach and the data used in this study. It
examines whether macroeconomic, financial market structure and political
indicators behave in a different way during the year preceding the exit.
Section III presents a formal statistical treatment which generally confirms
the visual impression emerging from Section II. The last section draws a
number of policy implications.
II METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1. Exits
Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R) classify the de facto exchange rate regimes into
14 groups, including one special case called “freely falling” which corresponds
to an annual inflation rate of 40 per cent. They use an algorithm to derive this
classification for 153 countries, relying on market-determined exchange rates,
which often differ from the official rates reported to the IMF. Their resulting
classification is indicated in order of increasing flexibility in Table 1. We adopt
this classification and define an exit as a shift from categories 1 to 11 to
categories 12 to 14, with a three year window, including at least two years in
the pegged regime (1 to 11) followed by at least one year in the new flexible
regime (12 to 14). 
Table 1: Exchange Rate Regimes
Category Characteristics
1 No separate legal tender
2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/–2 per
cent
4 De facto peg
5 Pre announced crawling peg
6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/–2 per
cent
7 De factor crawling peg
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/–2 per cent
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/–2 per cent
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/–5 per cent
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/–2 per cent 
12 Managed floating
13 Freely floating
14 Freely falling
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
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This choice is arbitrary, as is any classification. For instance, in their
coarser classification, R&R lump together categories 10 to 12, a case of limited
flexibility. Our reasoning is that in categories 1 to 11, the monetary authorities
are committed (de jure or de facto) to intervene or adjust their policy to uphold
a peg or a band, whereas they may or may not, at their discretion, do so when
they belong to the three remaining categories. An exit is defined here as the de
facto abandonment of any systematic commitment to maintain the exchange
rate within any band, wide or narrow, fixed or crawling.1
2.2. Peaceful and Troubled Exits
We next define a peaceful exit as one which is characterised by a
depreciation of the market-determined exchange rate over the period
comprised between six months before and six after depegging that does not
exceed 25 per cent. It may be surprising to use the evolution of the exchange
rate over the period before the actual exit. However, market-determined
exchange rates may well start depreciating in advance, in effect forcing the
exit. Ignoring this effect could lead us to mislabel as peaceful many exits
delayed for too long. 
Indeed, in a number of cases, the post-exit depreciation is small, or even
negative (which occurs in 9 instances out of the 55 cases considered here).2 The
unweighted average pattern, one year before and one year after the exit month
is presented in Figure 1. We also present some robustness tests, allowing for
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1 In subsequent work, we intend to explore variations in the definition of what constitutes an exit. 
2 The R&R data set of market-determined exchange rates ends in 1998. For the period 1999-2001
we use the official rates available from International Financial Statistics.
Figure 1: Average Exchange Rate Around Exit Time
(Average of 55 countries; index: exit = 1)
two alternative limits (depreciations less than 15 per cent and 40 per cent).
Our sample period covers the period 1975-2001. The start date is chosen to
eliminate the post-1973 period of widespread adjustments that followed the
decision to abandon the Bretton Woods system. The end date is guided by data
availability. 
Table 2 presents the 55 exit cases that match our definition of exit and are
analysed in this study, indicating the month when the shift occurred according
to the R&R classification. The peaceful exits are coded 1. Our criterion nicely
separates out the sample into 27 peaceful exits and 28 troubled ones. The
behaviour of exchange rates around exits times is depicted in the two panels
of Figure 2, distinguishing between peaceful and troubled exits.
Table 2: Exit Dates
Country Year Month Peaceful Country Year Month Peaceful
Algeria 1988 January 1 South Korea 1997 December 0
Argentina 1981 March 0 Lebanon 1984 March 0
Australia 1982 November 1 Madagascar 1985 July 1
Brazil 1977 July 1 Malawi 1997 August 0
Brazil 1999 February 0 Mexico 1982 February 0
Burundi 1996 May 1 Mexico 1994 December 0
Czech Rep. 1997 May 0 Malaysia 1997 August 0
Chile 1982 June 0 Moldovia 1998 June 0
Chile 1999 September 1 Myanmar 1983 May 1
China 1981 March 1 New Zealand 1985 March 1
Colombia 1983 October 0 Nicaragua 1979 April 0
Colombia 1999 September 1 Norway 1982 July 1
Costa Rica 1980 September 0 Norway 1992 December 1
Dominican Rep. 1982 August 1 Paraguay 1981 September 1
Dominican Rep. 1987 November 0 Philippines 1983 October 0
Ecuador 1982 March 0 Philippines 1997 July 0
Ecuador 1999 February 0 Poland 2000 April 1
El Salvador 1982 August 1 Singapore 1998 December 1
Greece 1981 July 1 Slovak Rep. 1998 October 1
Guatemala 1985 March 0 Suriname 1982 May 1
Guinea 2000 May 1 Sweden 1992 November 1
Haiti 1993 May 0 Thailand 1997 July 0
Iceland 2000 October 1 Turkey 2001 February 0
Iceland 1997 May 1 UK 1992 September 1
Indonesia 1997 August 0 Uruguay 1982 November 0
Iran 1977 January 1 Venezuela 1983 February 0
Japan 1977 December 1 Zimbabwe 1983 July 0
Kenya 1987 January 0
Source: Based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
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2.3. Potentially Explanatory Macroeconomic Variables
The next step is to assemble a dataset of potential explanatory
macroeconomic variables. Here we follow the theoretical and empirical
literature on currency crises to select the variables of interest. As we need
comparable variables, data availability is seriously constraining, of course.
Unless otherwise specified, all data come from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2002. 
The variables of interest include measures of the cyclical position during
the year preceding the exit and monetary and fiscal policies. The output gap
is computed by applying the HP filter to the real GDP over the period 1973-
2001. For monetary policy we use the average inflation rate over the previous
12 months, the evolution of gross international foreign assets of the central
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Figure 2: Average Exchange Rate Around Exit Time
(Average of 55 countries; index: exit = 1) Failed vs. Successful Exits
Successful Exits
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bank, and the pre-exit month nominal interest rates (both the level and its
change), all from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, December 2002
CD-ROM. For fiscal policy, we use the budget balance on the year preceding
the exit’s year.3 Other variables usually considered include the current
account balance as a proportion to GDP, the public and external debts, foreign
direct investment, each observed on the year before exit. 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Variables Before Exit
Peaceful Troubled
Output gap (% of trend) average –3.5 –6.5
s.d. 6.4 12.0
Inflation rate (% p.a.) average 9.5 14.6
s.d. 9.0 16.6
Change (%) in gross international reserves average –4.5 –43.0
s.d. 46.2 49.7
Interest rate, on month before exit average 8.3 27.0
s.d. 7.7 34.2
Budget balance (% of GDP) average –1.4 –2.9
s.d. 4.2 3.7
Current account (% of GDP) average –3.1 –6.9
s.d. 5.2 7.0
Public debt, total (% of GDP) average 30.7 26.9
s.d. 27.7 18.5
Public debt, short term (% of GDP) average 4.4 10.2
s.d. 3.4 7.2
External debt (% of GDP) average 31.1 46.6
s.d. 32.7 19.0
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) average 2.1 1.4
s.d. 3.2 1.4
Sources: World Development Indicators and International Financial Statistics (see text for details).
Table 3 shows the unweighted averages and standard deviations of these
variables for the peaceful and troubled exit cases (some observations are
missing). While the differences are rarely statistically significant,4 a number
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3 Because budget figures typically are only available and in fact meaningful on an annual basis,
we cannot tailor them precisely to the month of exit. This may be problematic, as noted below. 
of observations can be drawn. Peaceful exiters display a less depressed
economy (as measured by the output gap) as well as a lower inflation rate and
therefore a lower interest rate as well, lower current account deficits, but not
markedly better budget balances or public debts. Their public debts are
longer-term and external indebtedness is smaller. Interestingly, the loss in
gross international reserves over the preceding 12 months is one-tenth lower,
suggesting that timing might be an important strategic issue. 
2.4. Potentially Explanatory Financial Market Structure Variables
In an influential series of studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001), the
World Bank has argued that the developing countries that allow their
financial markets to develop achieve faster growth and, importantly, more
resilience to financial crises. As part of the effort, they have developed and
made available a database that provides a number of indicators of financial
development and structure.5 Based on this work, we have selected the four
indicators listed and defined in Table 4. In general, the peaceful exiters are
characterised by more financial development, but the differences are slim and
not statistically significant. 
Table 4: Financial Structure Indicators Before Exit
Peaceful Troubled
Financial depth: Average 51.0 49.4
Liquid liabilities (% GDP) s.d. 31.9 51.2
Central Bank Assets (% GDP) Average 7.6 6.7
s.d. 9.8 6.9
Deposit Money Bank Assets (% GDP) Average 47.8 42.0
s.d. 32.1 41.5
Private Credit (% GDP) Average 57.4 45.7
s.d. 42.5 40.5
Source: Beck et al. (1999).
2.5. Potentially Explanatory Institutional Variables
The importance of institutions in shaping macroeconomic policies and
outcomes is increasingly recognised.6 The literature suggests looking at a wide
array of political and institutional variables. Eichengreen et al. (1995) report
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4 Asici (2002) presents a battery of non-parametric tests. 
5 Beck et al. (1999) available at http://www.worldbank.org.
6 See, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000).
some evidence that elections, and the way they go, may affect the occurrence
and ultimate impact of currency crises. For the countries under consideration,
such data is not available and, in fact, many countries are not even working
democracies with regular and fair elections. For these countries, a number of
studies have looked at political fractionalisation, but such data do not apply to
the developed countries. For lack of a better alternative, we just use two
indices: the Freedom House index of political freedom and the index of
corruption perception proposed by Transparency International. The first index
does not discriminate between the peaceful and troubled exiters but the
corruption index powerfully does. Unfortunately, many observations are
missing for the corruption index which limits its reliability. 
Table 5: Political Indices on the Year Before Exit
Peaceful Troubled
Political freedom average 3.6 4.0
s.d. 2.5 2.0
Perceived corruption average 7.0 3.6
s.d. 2.3 1.4
Notes: The political freedom index ranges from 1 (perfectly free) to 7 (no freedom). 
Source: Freedom House. 
The index of corruption perception ranges from 1 (highest corruption) to 10 (no corruption).
Source: Transparency International.
III MAIN RESULTS
In this section we formally ask whether the probability of a peaceful exit
is statistically associated with the variables examined in Section II. To that
effect, we perform probit estimations on the (0, 1) exit indicator shown in 
Table 2. Although we have 55 episodes in our sample, due to missing observa-
tions for the right-hand side variables, the number of degrees of freedom
quickly declines as we add more variables and the probit procedure fails. As a
consequence, we have to severely limit the number of right hand side
variables. The regression results displayed in Table 6 are chosen to combine
as large a number of estimates as possible with apparently robust coefficients.
The results generally confirm the impression provided by the previous tables. 
3.1. Macroeconomic Factors
Quite clearly, the chances of a peaceful exit hangs on a timely move.
Taking the step when the economy is above its trend growth path, when
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inflation is low, when reserves have been growing and before the market-
determined exchange rate is falling, greatly enhances the odds of a peaceful
exit. The coefficients in Table 6 cannot be interpreted as the marginal effects
of changes in the right-hand side variables; these effects, estimated at the
sample mean, are shown in Table 7. They are generally sizeable and confirm
the importance of macroeconomic factors. 
The dog that is barking in the dark here is the public budget. It is never
found to have a significant direct effect and this is also the case of the public
debt. This result is surprising in view of the extensive literature that
emphasises the lack of public finance discipline as a source of currency crises.
The result here is that the role of fiscal discipline is not crucial for peacefully
exiting a pegged regime, arguably a different question. In fact, this result is
consistent with the model of Rebelo and Végh (2002) which finds that it is
optimal to promptly exit a peg when there is a fiscal policy shock. 
The role of the current account is less clear cut. It does not enter
significantly in Regression (2), although the sign is as expected. It enters
indirectly through the external debt, which is consistently found to reduce the
odds of a peaceful exit. This is quite reasonable: one year of bad numbers do
not have a very meaningful effect, what matters is the accumulation of
deficits. 
The results also show that losing foreign exchange reserves before the exit
hurt, although the effect is not very powerful as shown in Table 7. The sample
average of losses over the previous twelve months is 20 per cent so, on average,
waiting to exit in the front of exchange market pressure reduces by 4
percentage points the odds of doing so peacefully. Put differently, this can be
seen as evidence that many exits are forced, taken in the midst of speculative
attacks. Such forced exits, with declining reserves and a depreciating market-
determined exchange rate, are rarely peaceful. 
The role of the interest rate is more difficult to capture because of a large
number of missing data, even including where need be the non-market
determined discount rate. Preliminary results (not reported) suggest that a
high interest rate reduces the probability of a peaceful exit, even when the
inflation rate is kept on the right-hand side. This result, if confirmed, would
strengthen the previous observation that exits undertaken under market
pressure, whether it is resisted through foreign exchange market intervention
or an interest rate defence, are rarely peaceful. 
Two more results appear in Table 6. First, Regression (5) shows that the
worldwide incidence of exits during the same year negatively affects the
chance of success. The incidence variable is the proportion of all exits under
review that appear in the same year. It is strongly suggestive of contagion
effects. Indeed, many exits are forced by a speculative attack. Second, the
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literature on the push and pull aspects of currency crises (Hausmann and
Rojas-Suarez, 1996) suggests that conditions significantly worsen when the
US interest rate increases as it tends to pull in capital from other countries.
This is confirmed by Regression (4). 
3.2. The Role of Financial Market Structure
The financial market structure indicators are generally found not to play
a significant role, as already suggested by Table 4. Of the variables under
consideration, only the financial depth variable systematically enters
significantly, but with a negative sign. The mainstream view is that deep and
effective financial markets make an economy more resilient to adverse shocks.
A minority view (e.g. Rodrik, 1998; Wyplosz, 2002) is that this principle, based
on the questionable assumption that financial markets do not suffer from
significant failures, is not verified in practice. Increasing liquidity may
improve market depth and allow for better risk diversification, but it may also
make capital more footloose and thus complicate the task of the authorities as
they contemplate a regime change. This interpretation is buttressed by the
role of short-term debt, which is found in Regression (3) to reduce the
probability of a peaceful exit.7
3.3. The Role of Political Variables
The political freedom variable, which is available for all sample cases,
never appears to affect the outcome of the exit, in line with the observation in
Table 5. The index of corruption perception is missing for many countries, so
Regression (6) involves a much reduced sample, with generally poorer results.
Yet, in that regression, the corruption index is highly significant and, as
expected, it adversely impacts the probability of a peaceful exit. 
3.4. Robustness Checks
An exit has been defined as peaceful when the market-determined
exchange rate depreciates by less than 25 per cent during the one-year period
around the month of exit. In this section, we consider two alternative criteria:
the first one is more stringent, allowing for no more than 15 per cent
depreciation over the same period, the second one is more lax, with the
threshold set at 40 per cent. The tighter threshold significantly reduces the
number of successes to 16 from 27 with 39 failures instead of 28, while the
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7 When both the external debt and the short-term debt are entered in the regression, the former
is marginally significant and with a smaller coefficient than the latter, which is significant at the
1 per cent confidence level (but due to limited degrees of freedom, the estimation quality generally
declines).
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threshold of 40 per cent has a limited impact on the classification, with 30
successes and 25 failures. The corresponding results are shown in the
Appendix, Tables A1 and A2, respectively.
The results shown in Table 6 are generally found to be quite robust to the
precise choice of criterion. The evolution of gross international reserves does
not seem to affect the probability of success in the stringent definition, but the
pre-exit rate of depreciation still does, suggesting that it does not matter
whether the exit follows a serious loss of reserves provided it occurs before a
significant fall in the exchange rate.8 The effect of the inflation rate is less
well established under the stringent definition, although it generally remains
significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. 
The main difference occurs in the case of the lax definition, where the
budget balance now enters significantly but with a surprisingly negative sign.
This effect is estimated conditional on the output gap and on the size of the
(external) debt. When any of these two variables is removed, the coefficient
remains negative but becomes highly non-significant (not shown). One
possible interpretation is that just one year of a budget deficit does not matter
as long as the economy is not in recession and the debt remains moderate. 
Table 7: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Peaceful Exit
(percentage points)
Lower Higher Increase Lower LowerPre-exit
Inflation Output Gap in GIR External  Debt Depreciation
Effect of: 10 p.p. 1% 10 p.p. 10% of GDP 10 p.p.
Effect on
probability 31.0 2.9 1.9 13.9 18.5
Note: estimated at sample mean, based on regression 5 in Table 6.
IV CONCLUSION
This study is an exploration of the conditions under which an exit strategy
can be peaceful, where success is defined as a moderate depreciation or an
appreciation at the time of exit. This is a topic which has attracted limited
attention so far, with little available empirical evidence. As any exploratory
work, the results provided here should be seen as highly tentative. Yet, they
provide a fairly clear-cut picture, with a few surprises. 
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8 Note that the success criterion concerns the overall depreciation before and after exit. This
means that the rate of pre-exit depreciation is partly included in the definition of the left-hand
side variable. 
By and large, the central message echoes the work of Eichengreen and
Masson (1998): cool-blooded exits, enacted when the macroeconomic
conditions are favourable, are much easier than when they are forced, the
unavoidable outcome of intense speculative pressure. In other words,
countries which contemplate leaving a peg of whichever variety would be well
advised to make the move when it is the least necessary and the least
expected. This result runs against the instincts of policymakers but it is
unlikely to be surprising to economists. 
An aspect of this message concerns the external conditions. Currency
crises are often contagious9 and so are forced exits. Even if domestic conditions
are sufficiently favourable that no crisis is likely, contagion can suddenly occur
and force an exit which is then unlikely to be peaceful. This is yet another
reason not to delay exiting from a peg once the option is seen as desirable in
principle. 
There are also some surprising results. In general, efficient and deep
financial markets do not help with exits. There is even some evidence that
they might hurt, presumably because capital flows are larger and faster when
the markets are efficient. This raises an interesting question. The general
principle of the sequencing of liberalisation is that financial opening comes
last. The inconsistent trilogy principle, which underpins the two-corner
strategy, implies that a fixed exchange rate regime is unlikely to survive
financial opening. Presumably, contemporary conventional wisdom would
advise liberalising governments with the following sequence: internal goods
market liberalisation, trade opening, internal financial liberalisation, external
financial liberalisation and, finally, increasing the flexibility of the exchange
rate regime. The results found in this paper suggest that increasing the
flexibility of the exchange rate regime should be moved one step, possibly even
two steps ahead. The problem is that a floating exchange rate requires an
efficient exchange market, which in turn calls for internal and external
financial liberalisation, thus backing the classic sequencing rule. The solution
could be simultaneity, a big bang approach that combines internal and
external financial liberalisation with increasing the flexibility of the exchange
rate regime. Here again, the big bang approach may run against the instincts
of policymakers. Finally and unsurprisingly, good governments are more likely
to exit peacefully than corrupt ones. The channel of this effect is not examined
here. 
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9 Following the work of Rigobon (1999), there is some controversy regarding the existence of
contagious effects. Recent work by Wälti (2003) shows that Rigobon’s test is suffering from very
low power and that the methodology proposed by Favero and Giavazzi (2002), who find contagion
effects, is more powerful.
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